FBIS4-22768
"jpusr045___94016"
FBIS Report: Central Eurasia
6 April 1994
RUSSIA
ECONOMIC & SOCIAL AFFAIRS
Baturin on `Special Services'
Baturin on `Special Services'
944F0571B Moscow KURANTY in Russian 6 Apr 94 pp 4, 5
944F0571B
Moscow KURANTY
Russian
CSO
[Article by Yuriy Baturin, national security adviser to the
president of Russia: "The Special Service That 'Came In From the
Cold'"]
[Text] Yuriy Mikhaylovich Baturin is a doctor of law.
He was born in 1949 in Moscow. In 1973 he graduated from the
airspace research department of the Physics and Technology
Institute in Dolgoprudnoye. He worked in the Energiya
Scientific-Industrial Association. Since 1980--in the State and
Law Institute. He graduated by correspondence from the All-Union
Juridical Institute and the Moscow University School of
Journalism. The topic of his doctorate dissertation was computer
law. In 1990 he went through internship in Washington, and since
1991 worked on the staff of G. Shakhnazarov--M. Gorbachev's
aide. Since 1992--in the Gorbachev Foundation. On 17 March 1993
he was appointed a member of the Presidential Council, and in
June of the same year--the Russian Federation president's
adviser on legal issues. In January 1994 he was appointed the
Russian Federation president's national security adviser. Since
March 1994 he has also chaired the commission on supreme
military positions, supreme military and supreme special ranks
of the Personnel Policy Council. He has authored many works. He
was one of the authors of the draft law on the mass media.
"In from the cold"--this term, not quite precisely
translated after Le Carre's novel was published in
Russian--today reflects rather precisely the true situation of
Russian security organs. The structure that kept society
fettered by cold fear and mutual suspicion, and then itself
experienced harsh criticism bordering on revenge, is gradually
thawing, acquiring a normal human face, and becoming capable of
carrying out its real tasks. Russian citizens' natural interest
in the topic of special services cannot be explained by vain,
idle curiosity, or by the fact that the shroud of secrecy
surrounding the activities of this kind of structure always
arouses interest. And not only because reforms of our security
services are frequently accompanied by disturbing details. To a
large extent this interest is a logical trait of an emerging
civil society.
A society coming out from under the state's control and
intending in turn to control the latter has a vital stake in
getting the maximum possible information on state structures
whose activities to some or other degree affect human rights.
Especially our, Russian, society. However, for well-known
reasons heightened public sensitivity to the topic of special
services is manifested in morbid forms. The pulling down of the
Dzerzhinskiy monument in front of the KGB building in Moscow, as
well as the demand to liquidate "competent organs," became the
symbol of the public mood in recent times.
Today we see this as somewhat romantic, but also
somewhat naive. Russia is gradually regaining its historical
memory. The picture of the past is emerging increasingly fully
and in more detail. Of course, we do not want to return to state
arbitrariness, but we also reject other things--sedition,
anarchy, in other words, "grass-roots arbitrariness." The
reasons for the latter are known--a weak, impotent state. The
symptoms of this dangerous disease manifested themselves
graphically last year, and seriously alarmed most citizens. The
Russian special services felt this change in the public mood,
too. By now it is possible to formulate on the whole the social
order Russia's nascent civil society placed with them: to
effectively ensure the security of the country and its citizens,
and to protect Russia's national interests, one of the central
among which is the protection of democracy.
Last year, at a conference of high-ranking personnel of
the central staff department of the Russian Ministry of Security
[MB], President B. Yeltsin said that it puzzles him that there
are legally existing organizations in the country that openly
and publicly propagate ideas of seizing power and ethnic and
social strife, form and train armed commando brigades, and
openly operate as a mafia and control individual regions, while
the MB is either unaware of this or not showing the proper
initiative. Each of these questions is topical today. They
represent a threat to our national security. Russian special
services currently have the legal base to combat them.
In Search of Balance
The Statute on the Federal Counterintelligence Service was
recently published in the open press, and anybody may
now read it.
The document directly defines the area of the service's
responsibility. Among other things, it is tasked with
identification, prevention, and suppression of intelligence and
sabotage activities of foreign special services and
organizations, as well as unlawful encroachment on the
constitutional system, sovereignty, territorial integrity, and
defense capability of the Russian Federation.
This general definition is elaborated on in the form of a
detailed list of tasks set for Russian counterintelligence.
Among them: combating smuggling, corruption, international arms
trading and drug trafficking, illegal armed formations, as well
as illegally created or banned public associations encroaching
on the constitutional system of the Russian Federation.
The Russian Federation president's message to the Federal
Assembly outlined the priorities as we move toward a strong
state capable of ensuring conditions for safe development of the
individual and protecting him from criminal encroachment. Those
who see the idea of a strong state as equivalent to state
arbitrariness either are not being honest or simply are not
aware of the vitally important needs of modern Russian society.
For instance, the need to combat runaway organized crime aimed
at seizing command positions in the state.
At the same time, boosting the FCS's effectiveness, as well
as strengthening the state as a whole, today no longer may be
based on the notorious "at any cost" principle.
While constantly lamenting the lack of a law-based state and
neglect of legal norms, we clearly underestimate the processes
of disintegration of totalitarian traditions in Russian society,
which actually served as the main pillar of arbitrariness;
moreover, they continuously reproduced the need for it.
During the memorable times of the Communist Party's
political
hegemony, the lack of detailed legislation regulating
operational work was not considered a serious problem. State
security officers were guided mainly by the orders of their
superiors, and the latter--by the directives of party honchos
(the consequences are well known). Currently the situation is
already different. The very meaning of what is commonly called
military discipline is changing. It no longer represents a lever
one may use arbitrarily, outside of boundaries of the law.
Let us put it straight: The current legal base is far from
perfect. What we have so far is only the foundations for
regulating special services' activities. There are many
unresolved issues.
In special services' practical activities, a collision
frequently arises between political, operational expediency and
prohibitions imposed by legal acts. Undoubtedly a contradiction
between expediency and legality must be resolved in favor of the
latter; however, neither should the latter be reduced to
democratic slogans: It must ensure that we move along the road
of long development of democratic society and remove the
obstacles encountered along this road.
Russian legislation is oriented to a greater extent toward
protection of citizens' rights than toward giving special
services freedom of action. In principle, this is correct.
However, shifting the center of gravity in the matter of
ensuring the vitally important interests of the individual,
society, and the state at the expense of the latter, without
taking into account concrete realities in the life of our
society, may in the final analysis jeopardize the security of
the individual as well.
The priority for our lawmakers is to find the balance which
would allow human rights to be guaranteed and at the same time
ensure effectiveness of law enforcement organs' activities.
There are problems in this respect that require their immediate
attention. I will give just one small illustration.
The law on operational-investigative activities permits
listening to telephone conversations only with respect to a
specific person, regarding whom there is information
that he is at the stage of preparation of an especially grave
crime or has already committed one. But what does one do if such
an individual has not yet been identified?
The simplest example are foreign special service stations,
which operate, as high-ranking officials of foreign services
contend, under the cover of embassies in Moscow. Naturally,
foreign intelligence officers do not register themselves as
such; they must be identified, and, given their skills,
accomplishing this through regular methods is a hopeless
undertaking.
It is a vicious circle: In order to identify a specific
individual, who intends to commit a violation of the law, an
operational-technical measure is needed. But in order to obtain
permission to conduct such, it is necessary to have valid
information that the specific person has violated the
law. There are also other examples of the impossibility of
effectively conducting a counterintelligence investigation among
criminals. You may ask: Then how did counterintelligence act in
these circumstances? It varied, depending on the point of view
of the procurator who issued the sanction.
Since the new constitution has gone into effect,
operational-technical measures involving individual rights are
conducted on the basis of a court decision. Questions arise,
however: In obtaining such a decision, is it permissible to
present materials obtained as evidence for court consideration,
as is done in many countries? Within the framework of which
procedure? These questions, which define the specificity of
special services' work, remain unanswered.
On the other hand, neither are legal departments of security
organs very active in helping lawmakers find a way to resolve
these problems. Those abroad, on the other hand, actively seek
ways to influence Russia's leadership in the direction of
"fundamental reform of Russian special services." For instance,
the Heritage Foundation on commission from the U.S. Congress has
drafted a document with recommendations of how to bring
activities of Russian special services into line with Western
standards. The document proposes modification of normative acts
covering counterintelligence activities, specifically, for it to
stop monitoring foreign citizens' travel inside the country and
cut down on the use of covert sources of information. It also
recommends urging the Russian leadership to publish as soon as
possible drafts of new laws regarding special services'
activities and their financing.
We, too, want clear legal regulation and civilized methods
of
special services' operations, but of course on a parity basis.
For instance, a kind of gentlemen's agreements are reached
between special services of some countries on methods that
preclude violence. As to a common espionage
practice--recruitment and use of agents, use of technical means
for penetration and information-gathering, and so on--everything
in this respect is the same as before. No agreements will remove
the eternal problem of espionage.
In any case it is hard to imagine reaching such agreements
with terrorist organizations, organized crime groups involved in
illegal arms trading and drug trafficking, and illegal armed
formations.
Thus, what our counterintelligence lacks is not a civilized
demeanor, but rather aggressiveness, initiative, and
concentration on the greatest threats to the state. The
practice of years past, when, for instance, counterintelligence
officers were sent to monitor compliance with trade regulations
in stores and maintain order in the streets, and lately to
inspect motor vehicles in search of contraband, should be
completely eliminated. Special services are an expensive item
for society, and therefore they must produce the maximum return.
The task of counterintelligence is to select several targets
that are commensurate with its great capabilities, and try to
hit them.
Strictly speaking, some of the tasks included in the Statute
on the Federal Counterintelligence Service are not really
counterintelligence but rather belong in the sphere of domestic
intelligence, and all of them are part of the sphere of state
security.
One may argue to what extent the agency's name reflects the
range of tasks it is charged with. Still, I think that this is
not the main problem. The main issue is what place the FCS
should take among special services in order to successfully
carry out its functions.
The first thing one notices in reading the statute is a
certain crossover of FCS authority and that of a number of other
special services, as well as of law enforcement organs. There is
a temptation to concentrate efforts, for instance, on
suppression of corruption in one agency--for instance, the MVD
[Ministry of Internal Affairs]. But then by the same criterion
the tax police should be merged into this ministry, although
this is not done anywhere in the world. The simplicity of such
solutions is deceptive, since the sphere of law enforcement
needs a certain margin of safety.
The danger of duplicating activities between special
structures may be overcome by increasing the degree of their
coordination and, so to say, dividing spheres of interest. There
are examples of this both in our practice and foreign practice.
For instance, thanks to existing agreements no particular
conflicts arise between services engaged in intelligence
gathering (the FIS, the GRU [Main Intelligence Directorate], the
FCS, and others). A good example is the U.S. FBI, which over the
past few years has concentrated its efforts--thus making it
different from other law enforcement organs--on penetrating the
top organizational echelons of the drug mafia.
In addition, while considering the advantages of
concentrating all special forces along selected directions, we
also cannot dismiss another point of view presented by a number
of responsible politicians, who emphasize the lack of a sensible
balance of forces among organs of internal affairs and security.
Thus, in an organizational sense and in the matter of
interaction with other agencies the FCS occupies its own
specific niche in the system of special services. What remains
is the issue of coordination, but this is achievable on the
basis of the existing system of working liaison between agencies
participating in this work.
In keeping with the FCS Statute, counterintelligence organs
are subordinated directly to the head of state--the guarantor of
the Constitution of the Russian Federation, and hence its
sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity. Their
independence from local authorities is quite justified by the
specificity of the period our country is going through and gives
it sufficient freedom of action for aggressive offense against
corrupt groups and anticonstitutional manifestations.
Some corrections regarding counterintelligence could be made
through the law on counterintelligence which is currently being
drafted. In particular, it involves investigation of espionage
cases. Counterintelligence needs a reliable, professionally
trained investigative staff that specializes along these lines;
this is a necessity, not a sign of the FCS's punitive functions.
During the confirmation of the FCS Statute there were debates on
this matter and, it is becoming clear, it has not been fully
resolved. The idea of creating an investigative committee
remains an idea, while skilled cadres capable of investigating
complicated cases remain unutilized. Perhaps we should come back
to this problem once again. Consider it, weigh all the pros and
cons, and prepare proposals.
The organizational, legal, financial, and material-technical
conditions being put in place for the FCS are only half of the
matter. The main part is a trained corps of counterintelligence
professionals, without whom it will not be possible to get the
activities of this service going effectively, meeting the
demands of modern Russian statehood. Certification of Russian
counterintelligence cadres has been completed recently; it
showed that the FCS has sufficient potential. Evidence of this,
among other things, is the recent successes in disrupting the
activities of German and British agents in Russia. Any
counterintelligence operation requires a lengthy preparation
stage; therefore, the latest of the publicly known successes of
our counterintelligence are the result of the painstaking
activities that preceded them.
Whether there are many such successes or not is another
matter. The times when an NKVD [People's Commissariat for
Internal Affairs] oblast administration received a quota for
catching a certain number of Australian, Mexican, Thai, or other
spies--which was always met and exceeded--are past. But if we
compare the current effectiveness of counterintelligence work in
Russia and, for instance, the United States, the achievements
are roughly comparable. With respect to other lines of work,
however, Russian counterintelligence still has a long way to go.
"Feel the Difference"
Almost none of those who support the creation of a law-based
state argue, for instance, the need for a democratic state to
have such a special service as foreign intelligence. No wonder.
Intelligence organs as a rule do not work against their own
citizens--their activities are aimed outside, and this situation
almost everywhere is codified in the law.
This means that when the interests of the state do not
conflict sharply with the interests of its citizens, as is the
case with intelligence, the problem of special services
violating rights and freedoms does not look all that topical.
The main heat of criticism is reserved for domestic intelligence
used in combating terrorism, organized crime, etc., as well as
counterintelligence. But while the former, which is frequently
associated with political surveillance, is simply rejected as an
instrument of a totalitarian state, counterintelligence
seemingly is permitted to exist but under a constant fire of
criticism from all sides: from the authorities--for being
passive in uncovering and preventing internal threats against
the state; and from the public--for attempts to expand its
sphere of functions.
Against this background the public is offered time and again
novel but rather lightweight reasoning on the ways to
reorganize Russia's security organs. In it, the
authors usually work mainly from two premises: the need to
remove the threat to democracy presented by the heirs of
"competent organs" and foreign experience of building a special
service.
Let us leave aside at this point deliberate attempts to
mislead the public. The reason the authors of reform schemes do
not understand the substance of the issue, in my opinion, is
that they apparently incorrectly formulate their goal. After
all, if the goal is to remove a potential threat presented by
special services, the easiest way to achieve it is to liquidate
them. In other words, the best cure for a headache is the
guillotine.
If, however, the task is to create a democratic state that
possesses all means of maintaining its stability, the solution
should be sought in the balance of strength and efficiency of
special organs and the ability to keep them under control.
In this, it would be wrong to disregard extensive foreign
experience--without, of course, succumbing to the other extreme
of automatically copying other models without consideration for
the important special features of Russian reality.
Since there is an opinion that MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS
forecasts usually come true, let us take as an example
information received by the newspaper from a "reliable" source
about potential disbandment of the FCS and the transfer of its
component administrations to various ministries and agencies.
(Actually, this version was mentioned in other publications as
well.)
The economic counterintelligence administration allegedly
will go to the Ministry of the Economy. The counterintelligence
operations administration will find its rightful place in the
Ministry of Justice and will become something like a Russian
FBI. Everything almost like in the United States. But that is
the point--almost.
It would be appropriate to recall that many ministries which
have similar or even identical names here and abroad carry out
different functions. For instance, the U.S. Department of the
Interior deals with land development, management of natural
resources, and is in charge of natural preserves. The American
Department of Justice is more like the Russian general
procuracy. It is responsible first and foremost for monitoring
compliance with federal laws, represents federal organizations
in civil litigation, and acts as a prosecutor when violations of
the law are committed. By the way, the head of this organization
is at the same time, using our terminology, the general
procurator of the United States of America. "Feel the
difference," as the famous commercial tells us.
Besides, the FBI, strictly speaking, is not so much
counterintelligence, which is the task of only one of the
bureau's many services, as it is a special combination of a
special service and a law enforcement organ. Along with
counterespionage, the FBI's tasks include: combating bank
robberies, aircraft hijacking, bribery, and corruption;
kidnapping investigations; and other functions. Thus,
implementing the project "Let Us Do As They Do in the West" may
lead to the situation described in a fairy tale, where the genie
Khottabych made a precious-metal telephone apparatus. It looks
like a real one, but you cannot make a call on it.
This is the kind of "counterintelligence apparatus" we may
get under this version. In order to avoid this we would have to
make dramatic modifications to the functions of the Ministry of
Justice, special services, and law enforcement organs. But this
is already reorganization on a much greater scale, which will
demand an all-out reshaping of the structure of executive
authority. When are we to work then? And how much will such a
"reorganization"--performed for the sole purpose of bringing it
more or less closer to the American original--cost the taxpayer?
Continuing the polemics with such a proposal, it would make
sense to ask one more, most important, question: Will such a
structure work effectively in our conditions?
An example of a more or less successful reorganization of
security organs along Western models is the separation of the
Foreign Intelligence Service into an independent agency. The
relatively low cost of this undertaking (and there is cost
attached to everything) is the result first and foremost of the
fact that its predecessor--the First Chief Directorate--had
quite considerable autonomy even when it was part of the KGB.
The Border Troops were split into a separate service without any
particular complications for the same reason. However, such a
straightforward "improvement" of counterintelligence is
impermissible.
First, even within one counterintelligence
service, coordination of activities against diverse foreign
services aiming at different objects and persons in Russia
already represents a rather complex problem, which even now is
being handled with difficulty.
What will happen then if counterintelligence were broken up
into independent agencies responsible for individual foreign
services or objects or, even worse, both attributes at the same
time? A complex and very expensive setup for control and
coordination of all domestic special services will be
required--something like a Ministry of Coordination.
Second, in additional to actual operational units,
counterintelligence has support units--such as technical support
for operations--which in their current state simply cannot be
divided. This means that additional money will be needed to
create their own, "pocket" technical services, or the
aforementioned units will have to be given the status of
interagency bodies, with the resulting need for an additional
bureaucratic structure.
The situation is the same with respect to reference records
and information funds, dividing which and subsequently working
with them presents an awesome problem.
Third, what do we do about local
counterintelligence organs in republics, krays, and oblasts?
Divide them by offices-"departments"?
In principle, we could experiment, using any model of
building a system of national security organs--German, American,
French, or some other. But this is a costly undertaking for our
current situation, with the Ministry of Finance trying to save
every ruble. It is even more impermissible in the atmosphere of
political instability, where each imprudent move causes
thunderous reverberations.
Reforming the special services is normal practice even in
the
life of states where democracy is an established practice and
problems of distribution of authority have been resolved. But
nowhere in the world will we find reorganization for the sake of
reorganization.
New geopolitical realities and the emergence of new threats
after the end of the "cold war"--all this requires from any
state greater attention to special structures.
Reorientation of special services is quite natural. The
organizational capabilities, technical equipment, and financial
resources of criminal organizations in a number of instances are
on par with those of the intelligence services of some
countries. For instance, the income of South American drug
cartels is comparable to the budget of the U.S. CIA. One can
hardly hope to successfully uncover and disrupt extremely secret
activities of criminal groups without using special methods and
means.
One can hardly find a country these days where the tasks of
special services, as well as organizational methods of carrying
them out, are not being revised to some or other extent.
Our country is no exception in this respect. It has tried a
great variety of forms--from the VChK [All-Russian Special
Commission for Combating Counter-Revolution, Sabotage, and
Speculation], OGPU [United State Political Directorate], NKVD,
NKGB [People's Commissariat for State Security], MGB [Ministry
of State Security], and KGB to MSB [motorized-rifle battalion],
AFB [Agency for Federal Security], MBVD [Ministry of Security
and Internal Affairs], MB [Ministry of Security], and finally
FCS. There have also been attempts to merge the special services
with neighbor organizations. For instance, an Information
Committee under the USSR MFA [Ministry of Foreign Affairs] was
created and functioned, and even had its own intelligence
school. One can only be amazed at the variety of forms. It seems
that only the word "bureau" (if we leave aside the Komintern
[Communist International] intelligence service) has not been
used in the names of domestic security organs. It is a rare
ministry or agency that can boast a history so replete with
numerous transformations.
It is expected that we learn lessons from the past. One of
them is that any reform, in addition to planned positive
results, inevitably produces negative ones as well. First of
all, with respect to cadres. A special service is not just
buildings, equipment, and methods of operation--it is first and
foremost professionals. If they leave, succession is
broken; the ability to self-reproduce is lost, which is
absolutely counterproductive for a self-contained organization,
which special services always are.
One must also mention persons who assist security organs,
including on a covert basis. Successful use of a covert agent
network, without which special services' operations are
impossible, is predicated first and foremost on public awareness
of the tremendous role of these specific state structures, which
they play in protecting the civil society.
Let us draw some conclusions. For instance, how delicate is
the sphere of national security, which to a considerable extent
is linked with the general problem of distribution of authority
in a state. That society's expectations, its reserve of
patience, have reached the limit, and we cannot make any more
mistakes. That each reorganization is another trial for
professionals, and that an organizational failure, which
practically undermines the authority of counterintelligence, is
the worst propaganda anyone could conceive.
Thus, we can hardly qualify as an informational or
analytical
breakthrough of some mass media the fact that they regularly
spin out a version of another reorganization of the FCS.
Let us emphasize that standards for special services' work
are set not on the basis of theoretical models and foreign
analogies, but are based on the existing state system and the
tasks the state is dealing with at any particular moment in
history. How and with what resources counterintelligence organs
will be handling the task of ensuring national security, and
what changes are necessary in the FCS structure must be defined,
among other things, also at the initiative and with the direct
participation of the counterintelligence service itself.
On the whole, however, it may be said that the task of
reorganization has been solved by the Russian
Federation President's Edict No. 19 of 5 January 1994, which
approved the Statute on the Federal Counterintelligence Service.
These documents protect Russian special services from "cavalry
attacks," from destructive temptations--wherever they may come
from. It may be a paradox, but they complete the succession of
continuous transformations of special services that has long
acquired the attribute of ill-conceived perpetuality. The
meaning of these decisions is to protect the structure necessary
for society and the state from emotional, incompetent, faddish
changes; to create conditions not for future reorganizations but
for normal work of the Federal Counterintelligence Service in
the new situation.
Access to Special Kitchen?
It is obvious that a strong state needs strong special
services. For a country that wants to strengthen the state
foundation, the might of the special services must be
commensurate with the obstacles that will have to be overcome
along this road. However, in order for special services
themselves not to become such an obstacle, their activities must
be subject to strict state and public oversight. The creation of
such oversight is a problem for any state, since it inevitably
conflicts with such an attribute of any special service as
secrecy.
We know, for instance, of a recent incident involving Lady
N., head of the British MI-5 counterintelligence service, whom
the press "tracked down" after her name was made public. In
their evaluation, it would present no difficulty for numerous
terrorist groups in the country to organize a kidnapping of
Great Britain's counterintelligence chief from her home. This
scandalous incident is another argument in favor of those who
insist on preserving the British tradition of complete secrecy
when it comes to special services and their personnel.
British law sets very strict limitations on public access to
the special services' "kitchen." For instance, it is considered
a crime for any staff member (including former) to make public
any information about his organization. Even committed by a
regular civil servant, disclosure of information on special
services may fall under a criminal statute. There is also
liability for disclosing information concerning the activities
of intelligence and counterintelligence organs if such a
disclosure is made abroad. If we had such laws, perhaps this
article could not be published.
Nevertheless, the British taxpayer is not deprived of the
ability to find out through parliament what his money is spent
on in the case of special services. Let us note, however, that
Westminster is in no hurry to introduce broad parliamentary
oversight of special services and relies on a very small circle
of persons who have access to the shrine, first and foremost the
prime minister, who is personally responsible for the
organization of activities and oversight of special organs.
We should not blindly copy any democratic experience, but it
makes sense to study it. Especially considering that we do not
have our own traditions in this sphere. Therefore I
would like to warn those who advocate comprehensive deputy
oversight: A special service that is under open oversight is
finished. In this respect, our lawmakers must accomplish
extremely delicate work in creating and fine-tuning an
appropriate oversight mechanism, and certainly do so in
interaction with the judiciary and executive authorities.
Within the boundaries of his authority, the president of the
Russian Federation not only organizes the activities of main
Russian special services, including the FCS, but also conducts
oversight, and is responsible for them before society and the
state.
* * *
Special services per se are not a threat to democracy and
society. The threat stems from the desire to subordinate their
activities to any one political force or, worse, political or
nationalistic clan or group. In order to keep this from
happening in Russia, each branch of authority should provide in
an appropriate form a legal base for the activities of
intelligence and counterintelligence structures. However, these
structures, too--and first and foremost the Federal
Counterintelligence Service that "came in from the cold"--will
have to make a tremendous effort as well.