FT932-13960 _AN-DDUCWAD4FT 930421 FT 21 APR 93 / Still on the path to peace: The ANC has turned South Africa's latest crisis to its advantage in pressing for reforms By PATTI WALDMEIR Ignore the images of mayhem and bloodshed broadcast over the past 10 days from South Africa: the sober fact is that 35 people have died in violence linked to the May 10 assassination of African National Congress leader Chris Hani - a daily toll that is less than the average for the year as a whole. The ANC has spent the past 36 hours celebrating that fact, congratulating itself for containing what was potentially the most explosive event in South African history. Millions engaged in protest at the death of the man now guaranteed a place as one of the liberation struggle's greatest martyrs. ANC marshals dealt with crowds up to 100,000 strong, and subdued them without arms, with almost no logistical support, with the force of will and moral persuasion. It was an impressive display of discipline and organisation, and one which will give the ANC's future electoral opponents ample cause for concern. But if the ANC has crossed one hurdle without stumbling, others remain. Its leaders originally set out merely to manage the crisis caused by Mr Hani's murder. But now they have turned it to advantage, and have begun to exploit public anger to achieve broader political goals. As publicly stated, those goals are: agreement by the end of May on a date for the first multi-racial elections; installation by the same date of the first phase of interim government, a multi-party Transitional Executive Council to rule with the incumbent National party; and joint control of the security forces, blamed by the ANC for Mr Hani's murder (though there is no evidence they were involved). To support these demands, the ANC has announced a six-week programme of mass action - marches, strikes, and boycotts. Inevitably, public outrage over Mr Hani's death will dissipate over that period. But before it does, party leaders hope to be able to produce what has eluded them so far - concrete results from the negotiating table. Superficially, producing those results appears simple. For both the ANC and the government - the two main parties to multilateral constitutional talks - agree that elections should be held as soon as possible. The government wants elections by April 1994 and the ANC largely agrees, though it would accelerate the timetable by a few months. Likewise, the government and the ANC want to see a Transitional Executive Council - a multi-party body charged with 'levelling the playing field' ahead of elections - in place by June. That body, and its several sub-councils, would supervise any government action which has an impact on the political arena, but would not constitute true joint government. So the ANC could push the government, obviously shaken by the massive protests and fearing greater instability, to set an election date with despatch. But elections to what body, and under what constitution? Elections cannot be held until the multi-party forum decides how regions are to be represented in the new South Africa, whether there will be a unicameral or bicameral legislature, whether an executive president or prime minister, whether South Africa is to be a unitary or a federal state; they cannot be held under the current constitution, which bars blacks from voting. Yet agreement on a new, interim constitution appears to be months away. So the negotiators are left with an unenviable choice: risk public wrath by refusing to set an election date, or set a date without constitutional agreement. Once that is done, parties would be forced to agree a constitution in short order, or court national disaster by postponing the poll; a constitutional accord could only be achieved by forcing out of the negotiating forum any party which impedes progress towards early agreement. And such an exclusion could mean that potentially large sections of the population would not view the constitution as legitimate, jeopardising democracy in South Africa. The test comes when the 26 parties involved in the negotiating process return to the table. Apart from the government and the ANC, the third crucial participant is the mainly Zulu Inkatha Freedom party. The others can be steam-rollered without affecting the legitimacy of the constitution. But to force the departure of Inkatha - which opinion polls show might command 10 per cent of the national vote, and substantially more in the violent Natal province - would be a serious blow. Inkatha has already said an election date cannot be agreed until the fundamental question of the form of the future South African state, unitary or federal, has been decided. Inkatha opposes not just the setting of an election date, but also the installation of the Transitional Executive Council. For the party rejects any form of interim government, and wants the unelected multi-party negotiating forum to agree a final constitution (opponents of Inkatha's leader, Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi, say he wants a constitution written now because his influence would be diluted by popular elections he could not win). The ANC and others want a two-phase interim government, with the council to be followed by a power-sharing interim government, plus an elected body to draw up a new constitution. So the ANC will have to assess carefully the impact of its 'mass action' campaign. Its declared purpose is to put pressure on the government, but the most serious effect could be on Inkatha, forcing Chief Buthelezi to decide whether to continue in a process he opposes or to go it alone. He has already called the ANC's campaign 'ridiculous', and said it represents a 'setback for negotiations'. After months of patiently trying to draw Inkatha constructively into the negotiating process, the risk is that the two black parties will be on a confrontational path again. The ANC and the government could probably agree between them on an election date, a Transitional Executive Council, even on an interim constitution. The government recognises the power demonstrated by the ANC on the streets, and is clearly willing to be flexible. In any case, the gap between them is not huge. Earlier this year, they agreed on multi-racial power sharing through the end of the century, and though disputes remain over how decisions will be taken in the multi-party cabinet, they can be resolved. The two sides have also agreed on a substantial devolution of power to regional governments, and though details are still under debate, agreement in principle is a significant breakthrough. The main dispute between the government and the ANC is not constitutional, but practical: how to ensure that the security forces do not continue to destabilise the transition to democracy. For while there is no evidence of security force involvement in the Hani assassination - two right-wing whites are in custody for the murder, but they have no recent security force links -the perception in the townships is that Mr Hani was killed by the government. And many of the killings which followed his murder were either carried out by police (12) or in the case of the 19 people killed on the eve of the funeral, with suspected 'third force' involvement. The vexed issue of how to defuse the security force threat, under negotiation for three years already, is again coming to the fore. The government insists that political control of the security forces must remain with it; the ANC wants full joint control of the forces. Somehow, this issue must be resolved before any constitutional progress can be made. But even if it is resolved, the ANC's two other demands - for an election date and a Transitional Executive Council - must also be met. The government may try to deflect the public outcry by meeting the second demand while referring the first to an independent electoral commission, which would decide when South Africa was 'ready' for elections. This seems unlikely to succeed. Whatever happens, the ANC may yet regret focusing so much attention on the constitutional talks. They are tortuous and slow, and can produce only compromises, not outright victories for the ANC. The movement's leaders may yet find that it is they - not the government - in the hot seat, having left their constituents expecting something they cannot quickly deliver. Countries:- ZAZ South Africa, Africa. Industries:- P8651 Political Organizations. P9229 Public Order and Safety, NEC. Types:- CMMT Comment & Analysis. The Financial Times London Page 25