

# Serving Two Masters

An Empirical Study of Browser API Cooptation

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

Less  
Features

More  
Features





Less  
Features

More  
Features



Managed  
Memory


Pointer  
Arithmetic




# Outline

- Browser Complexity is Increasing
- Complexity is Often Not Useful
- Complexity is Harmful to Privacy
- Is Complexity is Harmful to Security?

# 1. Browser Complexity is Growing



1993: Mosaic



1995: Netscape 2.0



# CSS ZEN GARDEN



## THE ROAD TO ENLIGHTENMENT

Littering a dark and dreary road lay the past relics of browser-specific tags, incompatible DOMs, and broken CSS support.

Today, we must clear the mind of past practices. Web enlightenment has been achieved thanks to the tireless efforts of folk like the W3C, WaSP and the major browser creators.

The css Zen Garden invites you to relax and meditate on the important lessons of the masters. Begin to see with clarity. Learn to use the (yet to be) time-honored techniques in new and invigorating fashion. Become one with the web.



## THE BEAUTY OF CSS DESIGN

A demonstration of what can be accomplished visually through CSS-based design. Select any style sheet from the list to load it into this page.

Download the sample [html file](#) and [css file](#)

## SELECT A DESIGN:

[Sample #1](#)  
by Dave Shea

[Sample #2](#)  
by Dave Shea

[Sample #3](#)  
by Dave Shea


[Sample #4](#)  
by Dave Shea

[Sample #5](#)  
by Dave Shea



1996: CSS






1998: DOM1



1999: AJAX / XMLHttpRequest

# Observations

- API growth started off very slow
- API growth was “document” centric
- “Broad” APIs



# API Growth

## 2013

- CSSOM View Module
- Web Audio API
- Proximity Events
- Crypto Extensions
- Touch Events
- GeoLocation API
- Pointer API
- CSS Animations

## 2014

- Calendar API
- Messaging API
- RDF Extensions
- Progress events
- Network Info API
- Ambient Light API
- HTML 5
- WebCrypto API

## 2015

- Encrypted Media Extensions
- Web MIDI
- Service Workers
- Performance API
- Raw Socket API
- WebDriver API
- SVG 2 API
- WebRTC

2. Is This Complexity  
Useful?


# Determining API “Usefulness”

- Measure how often APIs are called
- Decide whether those calls are “useful”
- Simulate real world web browsing



# Measuring API Calls

- Selected 45 APIs and features
- Instrumented PhantomJS / WebKit
- Implemented missing APIs



# “Usefulness” Oracle

- Subjective measure
- Ghostery and AdBlock+ filter rules
- Measure API usage pre-and-post filters




# Simulated Browsing






DuckDuckGo

- Alexa 10,000
- 10,000 random URLs
- 10,000 random Hosts
- “Random” sites taken from searching UNIX dictionary tri-grams on DDG



AJAX



DOM 1 + 2 APIs


# Rare APIs

API Name	URLs
Battery API	21
Page Transition API	9
GeoLocation API	55
Shadow DOM	5


# Non-used APIs

- IndexedDB
- WebGL
- WebRTC
- Browser Name API
- Gamepad API
- SVG API
- Vibration API
- WebAudio API
- WebWorker API





# GeoLocation API



# Touch Events API

# 3. Browser Complexity is Harmful to Privacy

# Example: WebRTC

- Intent: Allow peer-to-peer applications
- Attack: Leaks local IP address
- Widely available (56.22%)
- Rarely used for intended purpose

Browser	Version Since
Firefox	22
Chrome	23
Android Browser	40
Opera	30


# Example: Crypto

- Intent: Allow applications to perform crypto operations
- Use: Generates persistent random identifiers
- Widely available (70.24%)
- Rarely used for intended purpose

Browser	Version Since
Firefox	38
Chrome	31
Android Browser	4.4
Opera	30
IE	11
iOS	7.1


# Methodology

- Load and measure each URL
- Reload and remeasure with Ghostery
- Big differences in API usage -> privacy-harmful APIs




CSSOM API (Document)





Crypto API



# Storage API

# “Non-User Serving” APIs

API	Pages #	Ghost #	Ghost %	ABP #	ABP %	Both #	Both %
CSSOM (Doc)	249	18	92.8	34	86.3	1	99.6
Crypto	7,713	1,123	85.4	38	99.5	27	99.6
Language	16,909	2,242	86.7	2,072	87.7	1,131	93.3
<iframe> Injection	12,110	3,202	73.6	4,464	63.1	1,351	88.8
Page Visibility	729	228	68.7	81	88.9	86	88.2
Websocket	225	99	56.0	58	74.2	43	80.9
Plugin Detection	18,116	5,870	67.6	4,133	77.2	3,512	80.6
Battery API	21	17	19.0	4	81.0	6	71.4
Storage	12,357	5,499	55.5	5,496	55.5	3,817	69.1

# “User Serving” APIs

API	Pages #	Ghost #	Ghost %	ABP #	ABP %	Both #	Both %
DOM 1 (creating)	23,304	22,651	2.8	21,409	8.1	21,266	8.7
DOM 1 (querying)	23,659	22,965	2.9	21,705	8.3	21,580	8.8
AJAX	20,016	19,027	4.9	16,153	19.3	16,303	18.6
Canvas API	2,095	1,949	7.0	1,676	20.0	1,694	19.1
User Agent	23,439	21,195	9.6	19,602	16.4	18,870	19.5
<audio>	307	292	4.9	247	19.5	242	21.2
Blob API	308	287	6.8	233	24.4	238	22.7
<svg>	860	798	7.2	520	39.5	527	38.7
History API	576	490	14.9	374	35.1	349	39.4

4. Is Complexity is  
Harmful to Security?


# @todo

- Status quo violates “principle of least privilege”
- Gathering data from open bug databases
- Lots of hand labeling involved...
- On going...

# 5. Conclusions

# Conclusions

- Browsers are growing in complexity quickly
- Mismatch between user intent and web author intent
- Mismatch between need and capability
- Harms privacy, might harm security





Thanks!