Fill in the <u>B l a n k s</u>: Empirical Analysis of the Privacy Threats of Browser Form Autofill

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Nobody likes to fill out forms

	Sign Up		Vhere a	are you shipping from?	Contact us	
	It's free and always will be.				Name	Company Name
Wha	China in a Address			Billing Address	Phone Number	Email Address
	Shipping Address			Street		
	First Name	Last Name		lumber	Which describes you best? Select Best Description	
	Address		Apt	lip code	Comments	
	City	e ~	ZIP Code	hipping Address		
	Email address for receipt		Primary Phone	Street	Submit	
	CONTINUE			lumber		
	We're committed to your privacy. HubSpot uses the informa contact you about our relevant content, products, and servic these communications at any time. For more information, ch	es. You may unsubscribe	from	Zip code		
				ed.		



Form autofill

New Member Registration					
First Name * John	Last Name * Smith				
John 123 Example Street	Addtree Line2 Apt. 234				
Clear form	Apr. 204				
Manage addresses	State/Province *	Zip/Postal Code *			
Chicago	Illinois 🗸	60607			
Phone *	Email Address *				
1234567890	john_smith@example.com				
	Submit				

VISA	AMEX -	-		
45				
2245				
Manage payment methods				
	••2345 n 06/20	••2345 n 06/20		


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Problem: Stealthy data exfiltration

- Malicious websites can obtain sensitive user data
 - Without the user's **knowledge** or **consent**
- We demonstrate 2 types of attacks:
 - Using **visually hidden** form elements
 - Exploiting **autocomplete preview** functionality



Visually hidden elements




- Hidden form elements in the page
- Filled automatically by browsers when autofill is triggered

Hidden input fields get sensitive data





Visually hidden elements



- CSS display property
- CSS visibility property
- CSS opacity property
- Covered by overlay

- Non-effective size
- Off-screen placement
- Ancestor's overflow





Visually hidden elements

Techniques	Firefox	Chrome	Brave	Edge	Safari	Opera
CSS Display	~	*	*	*	*	*
CSS Visibility	~	*	*	*	*	*
CSS Opacity	~	~	~	~	~	~
Covered by overlay	~	~	~	~	~	~
Non-effective size	~	~	~	~	~	~
Off-screen placement	~	~	~	~	~	~
Ancestor's overflow	~	 	~	~	~	~

Visually hidden elements - Measurement



	Firefox	Chrome
Sites w/ autofilled forms	21,589	31,621
Sites w/ hidden fields	24.52%	5.82%


- **Chrome** fills forms in **46.5%** more websites
- Firefox fills almost **3x** forms with hidden fields

Concealment techniques

	Fire	efox	Chrome		
Technique	Domains	Fields	Domains	Fields	
display_none_ancestor	9,177	12,675	692	1,111	
display_none	1,271	2,134	468*	758*	
covered	1,129	1,554	769	1,119	
visibility_hidden	109	211	117*	143*	
off_screen	94	131	249	497	
off_ancestors_overflow	88	131	91	144	
non_effective_size	61	74	53	75	
transparent_ancestor	23	42	75	123	
transparent	11	11	27	43	
visibility_hidden_ancestor	1	1	-	-	
*Chrome only autofills <select> fields hidden with these techniques.</select>					



Types of hidden autofilled fields





Cautious users may avoid using autofill.

Are they safe?




Autofill preview attack

- Does not require users to trigger autofill
 - Runs when user clicks on a field and values are previewed

- Chain together several techniques to bypass browsers' restrictions
 - Field-type mismatch
 - Side-channel leakage
 - Dynamic element replacement

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Autofill preview attack



- Preview values are displayed in overlay fields that are **not** part of the DOM
 - **Not** accessible to the page (i.e., through JavaScript)

Autofill preview attack: Field-type mismatch

<html>

Email Address	<pre>cinnut> alamant</pre>
Your email	<input/> element





<select id="email" autocomplete="email"> <option>john@example.com</option> <option>smith@example.com</option> <option>john_smith@example.com</option> </select> </html>



Autofill preview attack: Side-channel leakage

- 22 style properties that change when a *matching* value is previewed
 - Accessible through JavaScript
- Reveals that a value is previewed, but it does not reveal the actual value.


First Name			First Name John
Your name	CSS	Background-color:	John ACME Corporation
Your last name Company		rgb(232, 240, 254)	Manage Company
select an option 🗸			ACME Corporation



Autofill preview attack: Value inference

How the attacker can infer the preview value?


By replicating values across multiple menus



Autofill preview attack: Value inference

How the attacker can infer the preview value?

By replicating values across multiple menus




Autofill preview attack: Value inference

How the attacker can infer the preview value?


By replicating values across multiple menus

1 drop-down menu: Value_0(A), Value_1(B), Value_2(C) 2 drop-down menus: Value_3(AB), Value_4(AC), Value_5(BC) 3 drop down monus:

3 drop-down menus: Value_6(ABC)




Autofill preview attack: Browser Constraints



- Size constraints:
 - Max number of candidate
 values: 40,662
- Type constraints:
 - Do not support *credit card numbers* in drop-down menus.
 - Only autofill the first element of *phone number* type


Dynamic element replacement




Credit card number

- **Restriction**: not autofillable in drop-down menus
- Bypass: initially place <input> elements, dynamically replace them with <select> elements upon click
- Unlimited number of entries in each drop-down menu

Dynamic element replacement



Autofill preview attack: Demo



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Autofill preview attack

- Affects all chromium-based browsers

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
- Works in incognito mode
- Bypasses **probing size limitations** for all types of information
- Probes 100k candidate values in 4-5 sec (desktops) and 5-6 sec (laptops)
- Disclosed our findings to all affected browsers
 - Assigned vulnerabilities CVE-2020-6521 and CVE-2021-21181.
 - Chrome fixed dynamic element replacement

Countermeasure: Browser extension

Autofill Data Exfiltration X +	\frown
\leftrightarrow \rightarrow C (\textcircled{o} attack.com) 💿 🕨 🏦 🗄
Country	\smile
Your country	

- Stealthy data exfiltration is still possible
- A browser extension that detects all hidden form elements in a visited page
 - Lax mode shows a warning message
 - **Strict mode** removes autofillable hidden elements

This page has hidden input fields to collect: Name, Company, Street Address, City, State, Zipcode, Phone, Email. Please do not use autofill or Enable Strict Mode



Summary

- Explored how form autofill can be exploited for stealthy data exfiltration
 - Several techniques for concealing form elements
 - Large-scale study on Alexa 100k websites
- Novel and severe side-channel attack that exploits autofill preview
 - Does not require autofill to be triggered
- Implemented and released a browser extension that prevents our attacks

25

 Data, demos, and code are available at <u>https://www.cs.uic.edu/~browser-autofill/</u>.

