# Defending against User Identity Linkage Attack across Multiple Online Social Networks

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## ABSTRACT

We study the first countermeasure against user identity linkage attack across multiple online social networks (OSNs). Our goal is to keep as much as user's information in public and meanwhile prevent their identities from being linked on different OSNs via $k$-anonymity. We develop a novel greedy algorithm, incorporating an efficient manner to compute the greedy function, and validate it in terms of both solution quality and robustness using real-world datasets.

## Categories and Subject Descriptors

F.2.2 [**Analysis of Algorithms and Problem Complexity**]: Nonnumerical Algorithms and Problems

## Keywords

User Identity Linkage Attack, Countermeasure, Algorithm

## 1. INTRODUCTION

More and more Online Social Networks (OSNs) have emerged for various purposes. People provide specific profiles, interact with particular types of friends and join distinct groups on different OSNs. However, a person's multiple user identities can be easily linked by a practical *User Identity Linkage Attack*, leading to user privacy breach and put the users at risks unconsciously [2]. For instance, when the attacker links a user's two identities on Facebook and Linkedin, his/her professional connections on Linkedin are disclosed to the attacker, although they are not his/her friends on Facebook. More seriously, based on the integrated profile and inferred private information from the friends of the linked user, the attacker could create fake accounts pretending to be this person on social networks and then solicit others to connect, referred to as an alternative identity theft. Therefore, it is of great importance to prevent the user identity linkage across OSNs by malicious users beforehand.

In this paper, we develop the first countermeasure framework against user identity linkage attack [1] across multiple OSNs, in which we formulate an optimization problem to study the trade-off between user information sharing and

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user privacy via $k$-anonymity. We devise an effective algorithm to solve this problem and validate its performance and robustness on real-world datasets.

## 2. PROPOSED COUNTERMEASURE

We propose a countermeasure aiming to defend against the user identity linkage (UIL) attack, which can smartly generate features merely based on user's public information, thereby only needs 0.5% of user linkage information to accurately predict over 85% other user identity linkages. Our countermeasure is applied to each user on OSN1 (service OSN) by smartly hide his information for preventing him from being linked to their identities on OSN2 (auxiliary OSN).

**Problem Definition:** In order to tackle the trade-off between user information sharing and user privacy, we define an optimization problem, named *PRivacy-aware User iNformation sElection* (PRUNE) problem as follows: *Given a positive integer $k$, a user $\mathfrak{w}$ associated with two identities $\mathfrak{w}_1$ and $\mathfrak{w}_2$ on OSN1 and OSN2 respectively, i.e., $\mathfrak{w} = (\mathfrak{w}_1, \mathfrak{w}_2)$. The objective of PRUNE problem is to maximize user $\mathfrak{w}$'s information visibility in OSN1(service OSN) and achieve the $k$-anonymity for user $\mathfrak{w}$ between his identity $\mathfrak{w}_1$ and all user identities $V_2$ on OSN2 (auxiliary OSN).*

More specifically, a user $\mathfrak{w}$ achieves $k$-anonymity if and only if there exist at least $k-1$ users $S$ (identical users) on OSN2 such that $m(\mathfrak{w}_1, \mathfrak{w}_2) \leq m(\mathfrak{w}_1, u)$ for any $u \in S$, where $m(\cdot, \cdot) = \sum_{i \in \mathfrak{F}} \beta_i(\cdot, \cdot)$ is determined by Adaboost (Decision Stump) classifier on features due to its most serious consequence in UIL attack. Here $\beta_i(\cdot, \cdot)$ is the summation of coefficients in Adaboost classifier for each feature. The maximization of user information visibility is to max $\sum_{i \in S} v_i^{\mathfrak{w}}$, in which $v_i^{\mathfrak{w}} = 1$ means that user $\mathfrak{w}$ prefers to release information $i$ to public and 0 otherwise.

**Resist User LinkagE (RULE) Algorithm:** We design the RULE algorithm based on our observation that most of users on OSN2 are *distinctive users*, i.e., they have $\beta_i(\mathfrak{w}_1, \mathfrak{w}_2) \geq \beta_i(\mathfrak{w}_1, u)$ for all features between themselves and user $\mathfrak{w}$. Therefore, our proposed RULE algorithm iteratively hides a feature $i$ which maximizes

$$\lambda(i) = \sum_{u \in V_2^j} \mathcal{I}(\beta_i(\mathfrak{w}_1, \mathfrak{w}_2) - \beta_i(\mathfrak{w}_1, u))/v_i^{\mathfrak{w}}$$

where $V_2^j$ is the set of non-identical users on OSN2 after iteration $j$. The indicator variable $\mathcal{I}(x) = 1$ if $x > 0$ and 0 if $x = 0$. In order to efficiently find the feature $i$ with maximum $\lambda(i)$ in each iteration, we propose three priority queues with respect to the distinctive and non-distinctive users on OSN2 and feature sets: the priority of $Q_d$ is $\sum_{i \in \mathfrak{F}} \mathcal{I}(\beta_i(\mathfrak{w}_1, \mathfrak{w}_2) - \beta_i(\mathfrak{w}_1, u))$; the priority of $Q_n$ is $\sum_{i \in \mathfrak{F}} \beta_i(\mathfrak{w}_1, \mathfrak{w}_2) - \beta_i(\mathfrak{w}_1, u)$; the priority of $Q_f$ is $\lambda(i)$.

In each iteration, RULE algorithm (Algorithm 1) picks the feature in $Q_f$ with highest priority and updates $Q_d$ and $Q_n$ after removing the selected feature. The algorithm terminates if the number of users in $Q_d$ with priority 0 plus the number of users in $Q_d$ with non-positive priority is larger than or equal to $k$. Otherwise, if there are users in $Q_n$ converting to distinctive users, remove them from $Q_n$ and insert to $Q_d$. In $Q_f$, we recompute the feature with highest priority if some users in $Q_d$ becomes to identical users to $\mathfrak{w}$, i.e., their priorities change to 0. If its new priority is invalid, we remove it from $Q_f$ and insert into the existing order. The process terminates until there is a valid feature in $Q_f$. Note that in most cases, we only need to compute once to update $Q_f$ and this increases the efficiency of our RULE algorithm.

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**Algorithm 1:** RULE Algorithm

**Input** : $\beta_i(\mathfrak{w}_1, \mathfrak{w}_2), \beta_i(\mathfrak{w}_1, \cdot), v^{\mathfrak{w}}$
**Output**: visible features $S$

1   $S \leftarrow \mathfrak{F}$;
2   Construct priority queues $Q_d, Q_n, Q_f$;
3   $D \leftarrow \{u | \text{priority}(u) = 0, u \in Q_d\}$;
4   Remove $D$ from $Q_d$;
5   $N \leftarrow \{u | \text{priority}(u) \leq 0, u \in Q_n\}$;
6   **while** $|D \cup N| < k$ **do**
7      Hide feature $i$ with highest priority in $Q_f$ ($S \leftarrow S \setminus \{i\}$);
8      Update $Q_d$ and $Q_n$ after removing feature $i$;
9      Insert $\{u | u \in Q_n, \beta_i(\mathfrak{w}_1, \mathfrak{w}_2) > \beta_i(\mathfrak{w}_1, \cdot) \forall i \in \mathfrak{F} \setminus S\}$ into $Q_d$;
10      $N \leftarrow \{u | \text{priority}(u) \leq 0, u \in Q_n\}$;
11      $D \leftarrow D \cup \{u | \text{priority}(u) = 0, u \in Q_d\}$;
12      Remove $D$ from $Q_d$;
13      Update $\min_{i \in \mathfrak{F} \setminus S} \lambda(i)$ in $Q_f$ until validation;
14   **return** $S$;

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The running time of RULE algorithm is $O(|\mathfrak{F}|(|\mathfrak{F}| \log |\mathfrak{F}| + |V_2| \log |V_2|))$ in the worst case. Note that a more careful implementation can reduce the running time to $O(|\mathfrak{F}|(|\mathfrak{F}| + |V_2|))$ by maintaining $Q_d, Q_n$ and $Q_f$ within time $O(|\mathfrak{F}|)$ and $O(|V_2|)$ respectively. In addition, RULE algorithm achieves $k$-anonymity of user $\mathfrak{w}$ for any $k > 0$.

## 3. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS

**Datasets:** We collect data (Table 1) from three of the most popular OSNs, Google+, Twitter and Foursquare. Due to the infeasibility of collecting the information of all users in these OSNs, we consider the user identity linkage between *ego users*, i.e., the users we have crawled their complete profile and neighborhood information. Then we link the ego users on these three OSNs using their public API functions. Finally, we link all neighborhood of ego users, including friends, followers and followees, between these three OSNs.

**Table 1: Dataset Statistics**

| User Types | | Ego Users | Neighborhood | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | Followers | Followees |
| OSNs | Google+ | 258 | 86,652 | 86,297 |
| | Twitter | 48,100 | 11,485,756 | 6,319,928 |
| | Foursquare | 5,709 | 138,872 | 138,872 |
| Linked Crossing Users | $\langle$Twitter,G+$\rangle$ | 258 | 875,054 | 1,459,621 |
| | $\langle$Fsq,Twitter$\rangle$ | 5,709 | 11,448,961 | 6,352,896 |
| | $\langle$G+,Fsq$\rangle$ | 153 | 71,664 | 67,797 |

**Performance & Robustness:** For each pair of OSNs (OSN1 and OSN2), we consider each one of them as service OSN (and the other as auxiliary OSN) respectively, that is, we run our algorithm on OSN1 and OSN2 separately. Therefore, we will evaluate the proposed algorithm on six datasets. In terms of the inputs, matching function is derived from UIL attack with Adaboost (Decision Stump) as

we discussed in the above section. As for the visibility parameters, *w.l.o.g.*, we randomly select either 0 or 1 for each of the user's information.

We compare the solution quality of RULE algorithm with the optimal solution, provided via Integer Programming:

$$\max \quad \sum_{i \in \mathfrak{F}} v_i^{\mathfrak{w}} x_i$$
$$\text{s.t.} \quad \sum_{i \in \mathfrak{F}} [\beta_i(\mathfrak{w}_1, \mathfrak{w}_2) - \beta_i(\mathfrak{w}_1, u)] x_i \leq \Omega(1 - y_u) \quad \forall u \in V_2$$
$$\sum_{u \in V_2} y_u \geq k$$
$$x_i, y_u \in \{0, 1\}, \forall i \in \mathfrak{F}, u \in V_2$$

where $x_i = 1$ if feature $i$ of user $\mathfrak{w}$ is visible and 0 otherwise; $y_u = 1$ if $m(\mathfrak{w}_1, \mathfrak{w}_2) \leq m(\mathfrak{w}_1, u)$ and 0 otherwise; $V_2$ is the set of users on OSN2 and $\Omega$ is a large enough constant. The objective is to maximize the user information visibility as described in problem definition. The first constraint ensures $m(\mathfrak{w}_1, \mathfrak{w}_2) \leq m(\mathfrak{w}_1, u)$ for each user $u \in S$ in the $k$-anonymity, i.e., $y_u = 1$ for $u \in S$. The second constraint guarantees the $k$-anonymity. This IP formulation is implemented using the CPLEX optimization suite from ILOG.

**Table 2: Performance of RULE (visibility(%))**

| Dataset | | RULE | Optimality |
|---|---|---|---|
| Service OSN1 | Auxiliary OSN2 | | |
| **Twitter** | Foursquare | **99.231** | 99.231 |
| | Google+ | 99.578 | 99.582 |
| **Google+** | Foursquare | **99.202** | 99.202 |
| | Twitter | 83.287 | 83.620 |
| **Foursquare** | Google+ | **47.729** | 47.729 |
| | Twitter | 49.254 | 49.312 |

We test our RULE algorithm on these six datasets, with different $k$ values from 90% to 100% users on OSN2. As shown in Table 2, the visibility returned by RULE algorithm is at most 0.5% smaller than optimal solution, and reaches optimality in 3 datasets. And the running time of RULE algorithm is consistently less than 10 seconds, which is up to 20 times faster than solving the IP formulation.



**Figure 1: Robustness of RULE**

Figure 1 shows the robustness of RULE algorithm by measuring anonymity level with respect to different classifiers (service OSN > auxiliary OSN). As this anonymity level remains consistently larger than 40%, the application of our countermeasure can still anonymize a user with at least other 36% users on average as we select $k$ between 90% and 100% of all users in our experiments.

## 4. REFERENCES

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